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We show that the revised KKKP protocol proposed by Kye and Kim [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95,
040501(2005)] is still insecure with coherent states by a type of beamsplitting attack. We then
further revise the KKKP protocol so that it is secure under such type of beamsplitting attack. The
revised scheme can be used for not-so-weak coherent state quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can help two legal
parties (Alice and Bob) to accomplish unconditionally se-
cure communications which is an impossible task by any
classical method [1]. The security of QKD is guaranteed
by known principles of quantum mechanics [2, 3, 4] rather
than the assumed computational complexity in classical
secure communication. It is one of the most promising
applications of quantum information science and the gap
between theory and practice has become narrower.
Single-photon QKD was the first being theoretically
investigated [5], experimentally realized [6] and proved
to be secure [4]. However, the imperfect single-photon
source leads the QKD protocol vulnerable to the pho-
ton number splitting (PNS) attack [7] which limits its
application in practice. Therefore, several revised pro-
tocols have been proposed using weak-coherent states
[8, 9, 10, 11]. In particular, the classical process of basis
reconciliation may be an important source of informa-
tion leakage to an eavesdropper, known as Eve [9]. Very
recently Kye et al. [12] proposed a blind polarization,
where the sender and the receiver share key information
by exchanging qubits with arbitrary polarization angles
without basis reconciliation. (There is another protocol
where basis reconciliation is not necessary [13].) The so-
called KKKP protocol, named after the inventors’ ini-
tials [12], was thought to be secure even when a key
is embedded in a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse be-
cause only randomly polarized photons are exchanged as
another important advantage. The KKKP protocol has
generated considerable interests [14, 15]
Despite its advantages, the KKKP has been found vul-
nerable to impersonation attacks, due to the fact that a
key has to travel three times between the legitimate users.
As shown in [14], the original KKKP protocol [12] is in-
secure even if because of a mathematical loophole even
for single-photon keys. The loophole has then been im-
mediately filled up [12] and the protocol has been made
secure for single-photon keys. However, the strength of
the KKKP protocol lies in the possibility to use coherent-
state keys of reasonable intensity. If Alice is limited to
a single photon source, the protocol seems to be rather
inefficient compared with the prior art standard proto-
cols. In this Letter, we show the revised KKKP protocol
is still insecure for coherent-state keys, and furthermore,
we give a solution, which is robust against impersonation
attacks.
Consider the revised KKKP protocol [16]. (Here we
slightly simplify the protocol to perform (pi/2) rotations,
rather than (pi/4) rotations.) : K1. Alice sends Bob two
coherent pulses with polarization angles θ0, θ1. (For the
ease of presentation, we shall use subscripts “0, 1” rather
than “1,2”.) K2. After reception, Bob applies random
shuffling Uy[φ + s0(pi/2)] ⊗ Uy[φ + s1(pi/2)] where si is
randomly chosen from {0, 1} and (i = 0, 1). Bob sends
the two pulses back to Alice. K3. Upon reception, Alice
applies Uy[−θ0 + k(pi/2)] ⊗ Uy[−θ1 + (k ⊕ 1)(pi/2)] and
k ∈ {0, 1} is the key bit. Alice blocks one pulse and
sends the other one back to Bob. The polarization angle
of the surviving pulse is φ + (sb ⊕ k ⊕ b)(pi/2), and b is
the blocking factor for Alice to send out pulse 0 (b=0)
or pulse 1 (b=1). K4. Bob applies Uy(−φ) to the only
pulse he receives and measures the polarization angle.
The measurement outcome reveals the value l = sb⊕k⊕b.
Alice announces b and Bob uses k = l⊕b⊕sb as the secret
bit shared with Alice.
We show our attack by two arguments. A: If Eve
knows the parity value, s0 ⊕ s1, she can attack the pro-
tocol successfully. B: There is indeed a way for Eve
to know the value s0 ⊕ s1 without causing any distur-
bance to Alice or Bob’s detection. The B can be ex-
pected from the following fact: When s0 ⊕ s1 = 0, the
protocol reduces to the single pulse KKKP protocol [12]
actually, because Bob shuffles both qubits by the same
degree. When s0 ⊕ s1 = 1, the protocol also reduces
to the (double pulse) KKKP protocol [12], because Bob
shuffles the qubits always differently. In both cases, the
protocol can be successfully attacked by Eve. The former
and the latter cases are dealt with in Refs. [12] and [14],
2respectively.
Now we show A with an impersonation attack where
to Alice, Eve pretends herself to be Bob, while to Bob,
Eve pretends herself to be Alice in their quantum com-
munication channel. We assume that Eve does not attack
the classical communication between Alice and Bob.
Protocol A: A1. After K1, Eve intercepts both pulses
from Alice and stores them in set E1. Meanwhile, Eve
prepares two coherent pulses by herself with polariza-
tion angles θ′0, θ
′
1. A2. After K2, Eve intercepts both
pulses from Bob. After the treatment in the subpro-
tocol As, Eve stores the remaining pulses intercepted
from Bob in set E2. Suppose with subprotocol As, Eve
now knows the value s0 ⊕ s1. A3. If s0 ⊕ s1 = 0,
Eve rotates the polarization of pulses in set E1 by
Uy[φ
′ + s′0(pi/2)] ⊗ Uy[φ′ + s′0(pi/2)] and sends them to
Alice. Note that s′0 is set by Eve herself. After K3,
Eve intercepts the only pulse from Alice and measures
its polarization after a rotation of Uy(−φ′). The out-
come reveals l′ = k ⊕ s′0. Since s′0 is set by Eve her-
self, Eve knows the value k already. Eve rotates pulse
0 in set E2 by Uy(−θ′0 + k(pi/2)) and sends it to Bob.
As Alice has expected in the protocol, Bob will obtain
l = k ⊕ sb for sure after he measures the polarization. If
s0 ⊕ s1 = 1, Eve rotates the polarization of pulses in set
E1 by Uy[φ
′+s′0(pi/2)]⊗Uy[φ′+(s′0⊕1)(pi/2)] and sends
them to Alice. After K3, Eve intercepts the only pulse
from Alice and measures its polarization after a rotation
of Uy(−φ′). As one may easily see, the outcome is simply
l′ = s′0 ⊕ k ⊕ b. Since s′0 is set by herself, Eve already
knows the value k ⊕ b. Eve rotates pulse 0 in set E2 by
Uy(−θ′0+(k⊕ b)(pi/2)) and sends it to Bob. Bob will for
sure obtain l = k ⊕ b ⊕ sb, as Alice has expected in the
protocol. Since b is announced later, Eve can obtain k
by k = (k ⊕ b)⊕ b.
Protocol A shows that Eve may have full informa-
tion about Bob’s result without causing any noise, if she
knows the value s0 ⊕ s1. We now show that she can in-
deed know this by subprotocol As: Consider Fig. 1.
After K2, Bob sends two pulses B0 and B1 back to Al-
ice. Eve intercepts them and splits each of them by a
beamsplitter. To know the value of s0 ⊕ s1 is simply to
know whether the two pulses(defined as E0 and E1) have
the same polarization angle. Eve first observes whether
each pulse contains at least one photon by a quantum
non-demolition measurement. If yes, she takes one pho-
ton from each pulse and then guides them to a 50:50
beamsplitter after rotating the polarization of pulse E0
and pulse E1 by −θ0,−θ1, respectively. As it has been
well known [17], if the polarization of two input photons
are the same, one output beam must be vacuum. There-
fore if she observes one photon on each output ports,
she concludes that s0 ⊕ s1 = 1, otherwise, the result
is inconclusive. Before guiding pulses E0 and E1 into
a 50:50 beamsplitter, Eve may choose to rotate the po-
larization of beam E0 by pi/2. In such a case, if she
observes one photon on each output ports, she concludes
that s0 ⊕ s1 = 0, otherwise, the result is inconclusive.
Also, if initially E0 or E1 is vacuum, the result is incon-
clusive. If the result is inconclusive, Eve intercepts and
discards everything from Alice and Bob in protocol A.
If the result is conclusive, Eve continues her protocol A
with the exact information of s0⊕s1. (After subprotocol
B, the pulses E0 and E1 are consumed already and Eve
shall store pulses 0 and 1 in set E2 for protocol A.) This
attack protocol may sound plausible. However, there is a
limitation for it due to a high probability of inconclusive
events. The total of 75%, Eve gets inconclusive events,
and only 25% of the case can be used. The best strategy
for Eve is to prepare each pulses of B0 and B1 in photon-
number eigenstates containing at least 2 photons. In this
case, only with the probability of 25%, Bob will receive
any photons. Alice and Bob know in advance the bit
rate, depending on their channel efficiency and coherent
pulse amplitude Alice initially prepares. In [12], when
the channel efficiency is as low as η2 = 0.5 and the initial
amplitude of Alice’s pulse is 2.83, the successful detec-
tion of a photon by Bob is calculated as 63.5%. Thus
25% is too low to be unnoticed by Alice and Eve. If Eve
prepares B0 and B1 in coherent states of amplitude γ,
the problem will become more serious as the coherent
states already have non-zero probability of there being
no photons.
Here, we confirm that what we discussed above is the
optimum discrimination of the two qubits in parallel or
anti-parallell polarizations (See [18]). Eve can have more
setups to measure s0 ⊕ s1. For example, Eve increases
the photon numbers of B0 and B1 and take two set of
single photons from the pulses returning from Bob. She
then have two beam splitter setup: one setup to give a
conclusive event from the two qubits being in the same
polarization and the other from them being in the anti-
parallel polarization. This can however take enormous
resources from Eve. Of course, Eve can use spy pulses
in a singlet state to find if Bob’s operations are same
or orthogonal for the two pulses but we stick to only
impersonation attack as this will suffice our needs as seen
later.
Moreover, in the present form of the revised KKKP
protocol, Bob does not randomly change the intensity
or phase of the two pulses before he sends them back to
Alice therefore the two pulses sent out from Bob have the
same intensity and they are phase-locked. In such a case,
we can improve it using coherent state attack and photon
number discriminator detector is not to be necessary.
If two coherent fields of the same amplitude are in-
puts to a beam splitter [19], we know that the coherent
state will be driven into only one output port. Let us
assume that Eve prepares with a relatively large inten-
sity fields (amplitude is γ). Eve sends them to Bob as
she impersonates Alice to Bob. Upon reception of the
pulses, Bob adds rotations and shuffling factors. As is
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FIG. 1: Eve can know the value s0⊕s1 by detecting beam E0
and E1 appropriately. BS0 and BS1 are two identical beam
splitters. Pulses 0 and 1 are stored in set E2. Beams B0 and
B1 are sent by Bob after step K2.
shown in Fig. 2, receiving the pulses from Bob, Eve will
first split the pulses by a beamsplitter 1 (BS1). The co-
herent fields reflected by BS1 (amplitude rγ, where r is
the reflectivity of BS1) will be used to measure s0 ⊕ s1
and the transmitted field (amplitude tγ, where t is the
transmissivity) will be stored and eventually sent back to
Bob. The reflected pulses will be further split into two
by a 50:50 beam splitter (BS2). The reflected pulses of
BS2 will be used to measure if the two pulses are parallel
to each other, while the transmitted pulses will be used
to check if they are orthogonal. Here we only consider
the orthogonal measure. The first and second are split by
the dynamic reflector (DR) to give a time delay to the
first pulse to meet the second at a 50:50 beam splitter
(BS3). If they are of the same polarization, both pulses
will be detected in photon detector 1 (PD1). The am-
plitude of the coherent field to PD1 is
√
2rγ and if they
are orthogonal, they do not interfere and the amplitude
of coherent fields to PD1 and PD2 are both rγ. If Eve
detects any photon, then it is due to the fact that the
two were orthogonal.
Here, we remind that for a non-zero amplitude coher-
ent field, there is non-zero probability of no photon de-
tected so there is also a chance of inconclusive events.
The success probability is calculated using the Poisso-
nian nature of coherent state. Psuccess = (1 − e−r2γ2)2.
Similarly, Eve measures if two pulses are parallel to each
other by rotating the polarization angle of one of the
pulses by pi/2. The success probability is again Psuccess.
Therefore, the total probability of success is also Psuccess.
Eve then let the pulses go to Bob in the conclusive
cases for which Bob still has a probability of receiving
zero photons as a coherent state of tγ will travel to Bob.
The total probability of Bob receiving any photons then
is PB = Psuccess(1 − e−t2γ2). Eve knows the bit rate
so she can make PB to make it equal to the bit rate by
changing γ. Eve then has implemented the subprotocol
As successfully without having her action noticed by Al-
ice and Bob. The revised KKKP protocol, with the idea
being interesting, in its present form does not offer the
security as it has been supposed therefore a more care-
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FIG. 2: Scheme for Eve to find if the two coherent pulses are
of orthogonal or parallel polarization. DR: dynamic reflector
to reflect only the first pulse while the second pulse is let to
transmit. BS: beam splitters. PD: photo detectors
ful investigation is needed for real applications. Now we
offer a possible solution.
Consider the following protocol W:
W1: same with step K1 of KKKP protocol. W2: Upon
reception, Bob applies random shuffling Uy[φ+s0(pi/2)]⊗
Uy[φ + δ(pi/4) + s1(pi/2)] where si ∈ {0, 1}(i ∈ 0, 1),
δ ∈ {0, 1} are random numbers. Bob sends the two pulses
back to Alice. W3: Upon reception, Alice decides ran-
domly to either use the received pulses for test or continue
the protocol for sharing a secret bit with Bob. If she de-
cides to continue, she applies Uy[−θ0+k(pi/2)]⊗Uy[−θ1+
k(pi/2)] and k ∈ {0, 1} is the key bit. Alice blocks one
pulse and sends the other one back to Bob. (Alice also
detects the blocked pulse to make sure that this is not in
vacuum.) The polarization angle of the surviving pulse is
φ+(sb⊕k⊕b)(pi/2)+bδ(pi/4), and b is the blocking factor
for Alice to send out pulse 0 (b=0) or pulse 1 (b=1). Al-
ternatively, Alice may decide to consume the pulses from
Bob to inspect the presence of Eve who tries to detect
the blocking factor b by sending her two different pulses
of photon-number eigenstates (Eve cannot use coherent
pulses of different amplitude because it is not possible
to tag them as two coherent states are not orthogonal).
In order to do the test, she can use the coherent-state
comparison technique as used by Eve described above.
In this case, when the two coherent-state pulses of the
same amplitudes should be driven to only one output
port while the two photon-number eigenstates of differ-
ent photon numbers would appear in the both output
ports. Of course, there also is some non-zero probabil-
ity of two photon-number eigenstates to appear in only
one output port. Alice can check the probability of the
all-or-nothing events and if it is less than desired she will
have to abolish the keys assuming there having been Eve
in the middle. W4. Bob applies Uy[−φ − ∆(pi/4)] to
the only pulse he receives and measures the polarization
angle. Pulse 1 is randomly chosen from 0 or δ. If ∆ hap-
pens to be equal to bδ, the measurement outcome reveals
the value l = k ⊕ b ⊕ sb. Alice announces b and Bob
uses k = l ⊕ b ⊕ sb as the secret bit shared with Alice if
4∆ = bδ. If ∆ 6= bδ, they discard the data. W5. They run
the above program for N times. W6. Alice announces
which times she has used the pulses for test in step W3.
Bob announces the values of δ and s0, s1 he has chosen
for those times. Alice only needs to consider those test-
ing results where her rotation angle ω(pi/4) happens to
be equal to [2(s0 + s1) − δ](pi/4). If they are all single-
clickings, she judges that there is no Eve, otherwise, she
aborts the protocol. W7. Alice and Bob also compare
some of their bits through classical communications to
see whether they have indeed shared the same key.
In the protocol above, there are two different types of
error tests. Step W6 is to test whether there is Eve who
tries to detect the blocking factor b by sending Alice two
different pulses. W7 is to test whether there is Eve who
tries to know k or equivalently, s0 ⊕ s1. Given protocol
W, Eve cannot use the subprotocol B to obtain s0 ⊕
s1 without causing any noise. Say, no matter how she
rotates beam E0 or E1, any value of s0⊕s1 can cause the
event of two-fold clicking. Without the exact information
about s0 ⊕ s1 at that time, she cannot continue protocol
A because she would cause noise in Bob’s key and this
may be detected in step W7.
In summary, we have shown that the revised KKKP
protocol[16] in its present form fails under a type of
beamsplitter attack. We also propose a protocol which
is robust against any impersonation attack.
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